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MNC ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND SUBSIDIARY MOTIVATION PROBLEMS:  
CONTROLLING INTERVENTION HAZARDS IN THE NETWORK MNC 
 
Abstract 
The MNC literature treats the (parent) HQ as entirely benevolent with respect to their 
perceived and actual intentions when they intervene at lower levels of the MNC. 
However, HQ may intervene in subsidiaries in ways that demotivate subsidiary 
employees and managers (and therefore harm value-creation). This may happen even if 
such intervention is benevolent in its intentions. We argue that the movement away 
from more traditional hierarchical forms of the MNC and towards network MNCs 
placed in more dynamic environments gives rise to more occasions for potentially 
harmful intervention by HQ. Network MNCs should therefore be particularly careful to 
anticipate and take precautions against “intervention hazards.” Following earlier 
research, we point to the role of normative integration and procedural justice, but argue 
that they also serve to control harmful HQ intervention (and not just subsidiary 
opportunism).  
 
Keywords: The network MNC, MNC HQ, managerial intervention and opportunism, 






In the extant literature on the multinational corporation (MNC), the parent headquarters (HQ) plays 
a wholly benevolent role.
1
 It is recognized that the HQ may be ill-informed, for example because of 
information overload (Egelhoff, 1991, 2010), radical uncertainty (Forsgren & Holm, 2010), or sheer 
ignorance (Forsgren, Holm & Johanson, 2005), and may suffer from “bounded reliability” (Verbeke 
& Greidanus, 2009). These problems may give rise to managerial errors in decision-making, such as 
failing to recognize synergies between lower-level units, implementing badly designed reward 
systems, and cannibalizing product lines. Such errors harm value-creation at the level of 
subsidiaries and the MNC. 
 However, there is little or no questioning in the literature that the HQ is somehow motivated 
to add value to the overall MNC network and is perceived as such by other units in the MNC.
2
 
Thus, the literature specifies how the HQ engages in strategic planning, assists the subsidiaries with 
various support functions, transfers useful knowledge to the subsidiaries, orchestrates lateral 
knowledge transfers across the MNC network, and reduces latent or manifest incentive problems by 
deploying means of organizational control (e.g. Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1989; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; O’Donnell, 2000; Doz & Prahalad, 1984). Furthermore, the HQ is supposed to differentiate 
its coordination and control mechanisms according to the specific subsidiary situation, while not 
sacrificing firm-level performance for sub-unit gains (Nohria & Ghoshal 1994). Such acts of 
intervention, either directly or by creating organizational infrastructure, add to MNC-wide value 
                                                          
1
 We follow the usual understanding of the HQ as the entity at the top of a firm that assumes responsibility for functions 
like strategic planning, corporate communications, tax, legal, marketing, finance, human resources and information 
technology. HQ includes the CEO and other members of the top-management team, support functions for top-
management team, corporate policy making functions, and corporate services of all kinds. 
2
 To illustrate, none of the contributors to a recent edited volume titled Managing the Contemporary Multinational: The 
Role of HQ (Andersson & Holm, 2010) question the assumption of fundamentally benevolent HQ, although Benito and 
Tomassen (2010) implicitly raise the conceptual possibility of opportunistic HQs in their discussion of bonding costs 
between the HQ and the subsidiaries. Similarly, none of the contributors to a recent special issue (Management 




creation, save for those instances where errors turn out (retrospectively) to have been made. If they 
have any direct impact on subsidiary motivation, it is a positive one.  
 We argue that this assumption of general (perceived) HQ benevolence is one that needs 
substantial modification, particularly because of the emergence and diffusion of more decentralized 
and less formalized “network forms” of the MNC that have emerged in response to increased 
dynamism and heterogeneity in MNC environments. We argue that HQ may intervene in 
subsidiaries in a manner that demotivates subsidiary employees and managers, even if such 
intervention is entirely benevolent in its intentions. Interventions by HQ often amount to breaking 
with existing routines and procedures—which often function as truces (Nelson & Winter, 1982)—, 
overriding existing instructions of employees or subsidiaries. In those MNCs where subsidiaries 
enjoy considerable autonomy, HQ intervention may amount to overruling decisions that units have 
made on the basis of decision rights that have been delegated to them (see Hofstede [1967] for the 
case of budgets). Or, intervention may consist of directly reducing the level of autonomy of the 
subsidiary. Motivational problems with far-reaching and negative implications for productivity, 
extra-role behaviors, and, by consequence, subsidiary- and MNC-level value creation can arise 
when subsidiary managers and employees perceive such intervention as ill-intentioned or simply as 
meddling. In fact, they may overwhelm any positive effects the intervention may otherwise have. In 
analogy to the notion of “contractual hazards” in the economics of the firm (Williamson, 1985) we 
refer to managerial interventions that harm motivation and have negative implications for value 
creation an “intervention hazard.”3  
We argue that the movement away from more traditional hierarchical forms of the MNC and 
towards network-based forms gives rise to more occasions for potentially harmful HQ intervention. 
Such forms are typically based in uncertain environments that may motivate intervention by HQ 
                                                          
3
 Note that this construct includes both those situations where net value creation is harmed and those where it is only 
gross value creation that is harmed (i.e., the intervention harms motivation but still creates net value). Presumably, it is 
desirable to avoid harming motivation in any case.  
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(Williamson, 1991). Any firm faces the problem of promoting beneficial HQ intervention, while 
constraining intervention hazards. However, we argue that the problem is particularly pressing to 
network MNCs; therefore, they should be particularly careful to anticipate and take precautions 
against intervention hazards. 
We thus contribute to answering the question that Kim and Mauborgne (1993) described as 
one of the most compelling ones in international management: How can MNCs motivate their sub-
units?
 4
 Although almost two decades have passed since this issue was raised as a crucial one; and 
yet, research on it still remains scarce. We relate to Kim and Mauborgne (1993) and Nohria and 
Ghoshal (1994) by invoking normative integration and procedural justice as mechanisms that may 
reduce the incidence and severity of intervention hazards. However, we turn their argument around: 
While these two constructs have been treated as means to manage and control subsidiaries, we 
argue that they might serve as means to control the HQ.  Note the counterfactual nature of our 
argument: Because network MNCs are more likely to be plagued by intervention hazards than more 
hierarchical MNCs, they are also more likely to make use of normative integration and procedural 
justice to control latent intervention hazards.  
THE NETWORK MNC AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Research Framework 
Our overall research framework is depicted in Figure 1. We seek to link a specific 
organizational form of the MNC, the network form, to the incidence of intervention hazards. 
Selective intervention influences the motivation of MNC subunits, which in turn has performance 
consequences. In the following we work our way from the left towards the right in the figure, 
                                                          
4
 Throughout our analysis we operate with two assumptions which we deem necessary for reasons of simplicity and 
theoretical rigor. First, we assume that the MNC operates only with two hierarchical layers, that is, with the corporate 
HQ and the subsidiary level. Second, we assume that the motivation of a subsidiary is to a large extent represented by 
the motivation of the subsidiary top manager. This is appropriate based on the idea that the subsidiary top manager is 
probably one of the key contact persons for the corporate HQ while she/he also influences to a large extent how the rest 




describing each key construct in the process and explaining the causal links between them.  As 
indicated in the figure we draw on three distinct bodies of literature. First, our overall 
conceptualization of the MNC in its various forms is informed by the MNC literature (e.g., 
Hedlund, 1986; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1989; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Egelhoff, 2010). We 
argue, however, that this literature is characterized by a research gap; specifically it fails to 
systematically address the link between HQ interventions and subsidiary motivations and the 
consequences of this. Economic theorists of the firm highlight how opportunism may sometimes be 
exercised by managers (Dow, 1987; Kreps, 1990; Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 1999), harming 
productivity and value creation (Williamson, 1985; Kreps, 1990; Miller, 1992; Aghion & Tirole, 
1997; Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 1999; Foss, 2003). Thus, like Egelhoff (2010) we draw on the 
economics of the firm for the purpose of understanding the role of the HQ, but go beyond the uni-
dimensional treatment of motivation in this research stream. We provide a richer view of motivation 
and how it is influenced by management action. Specifically, we draw on the literature in the 
organizational behavior field that explores the negative motivational consequences of such 
intervention in the context of employment relations (e.g. Brockner, Tyler, Cooper & Schneider, 
1992; Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000).  
─────────────────── 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
─────────────────── 
New Network Forms of the MNC 
MNC structures have traditionally been analyzed as formal hierarchical structures (e.g. 
Stopford & Wells, 1972, Daniels, Pitts & Tretter, 1984; Gates & Egelhoff, 1986). In the last 
decades, new network-like forms of MNCs have been discussed intensively and have been 
positioned as alternatives to the traditional hierarchical model (Malnight, 1996). Network structures 
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cover a variety of conceptualizations in the MNC literature, such as the heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986), 
the multifocal firm (Prahalad & Doz, 1987), the inter-organizational network (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 
1990), the transnational firm (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), or the geocentric model (Perlmutter, 
1969). No single clear definition of what a MNC network structure really is exists. However, the 
above concepts share the assumption that hierarchical and highly formalized organizational 
structures with a high degree of specialization and decision-making power concentrated on the top 
are less suited for meeting the organizational and management challenges of learning organizations 
in turbulent environments. In contrast, a high degree of decentralization, relatively little 
formalization, lateral communication and knowledge transfer between loosely coupled units, and a 
variety of “integrating mechanisms,” such as normative integration and project teams (O’Donnell, 
2000) complement traditional authority mechanisms in coping with such challenges (e.g. Malnight, 
1996).
5
 Drawing on the above contributions, we proffer the following definition:  
Definition: A network MNC strongly delegates decision rights to subsidiaries, while 
retaining some decision-rights at the HQ. It is often characterized by a low degree of 
formalization, extensive lateral communication and knowledge transfer. Its 
subsidiaries are often resource-rich, hence powerful. It is a change-oriented 
organization situated in high-dynamism environments in which local adaptation as 
well as integration pressures coexist. 
The HQ in the Network MNC 
While the network model has arguably been prompted by dynamic environments, key 
elements of hierarchies, such as centralized decision-making for specific activities (e.g., overall 
strategy making, branding issues, organizational design decisions, etc.) remain. In other words, 
there is still an important role for the HQ in the modern network MNC. However, as Egelhoff 
                                                          
5
 A parallel trend in organization theory similarly argues that traditional hierarchies increasingly give way to “internal 
hybrids” that are better suited to deal with the challenges of dynamic contexts (Zenger & Hesterly, 1997). 
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(2010: 404) points out, the literature on the network MNC “… has tended to ignore both the general 
role of hierarchy and the more specific role of a parent HQ in MNCs.” The literature on the network 
MNC places relatively more emphasis on the subsidiary level, notably the role that subsidiaries play 
within the MNC (Birkinshaw & Pedersen, 2009). Thus, research has examined the “mandates” of 
subsidiaries, what makes for an “entrepreneurial” subsidiary, lateral knowledge flows between 
subsidiaries, and so on (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1997a, 2001). In fact, in this literature there has been a 
tendency to regard the HQ as merely one unit among many others that does not necessarily have 
neither the knowledge nor the power to effectively exercise authority over subsidiaries (Andersson 
et al., 2007; Doz et al., 2001; Tallman & Koza, 2010). This tendency may have contributed to the 
literature being less forthcoming about the role of the HQ in a network MNC.   
Authority in the Theory of the Firm  
We are uncomfortable with this tendency. Within the MNC, as in any firm, the HQ is the 
holder of ultimate decision rights, or authority (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 1999). Specifically, it 
holds rights of fiat relative to other MNC units, notably the subsidiaries. A key theme in the theory 
of the firm since Coase (1937) is that the exercise of managerial fiat, or authority, in response to 
changes in the environment provides a reason why firms exist (Casson, 1994; Williamson 1996). In 
Coase (1937; see also Simon, 1951) authority means that the manager (or, in the present context, 
the HQ) picks a well-defined action from the employee’s (or, subsidiary’s) action set and instructs 
him to carry out this action. Obviously, this presupposes that the manager (HQ) is more informed 
than the employee (subsidiary) about which action should rationally be chosen, and that the 
manager (HQ) has full knowledge of the employee’s (subsidiary’s) action set. Both assumptions are 
clearly unrealistic, given the increasing importance of geographically distant subsidiary units that 
are included in the MNC portfolio, often for exactly the reason that they possess knowledge 
advantages relative to the rest of the MNC.  
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However, Simon (1991: 31) points out authority may be understood more broadly, namely as 
a command that takes the form of a result to be produced, a principle to be applied, or goal 
constraints, so that “[o]nly the end goal has been supplied by the command, and not the method of 
reaching it.” However, even this is arguably too narrow.  Usually, some aspects of “the method of 
reaching” an end goal are specified, so that employees are seldom granted full discretion.  Indeed, a 
function of authority is placing restrictions on the decision rights that are granted to employees with 
respect to how they reach an end goal (Holmström, 1999). This function of authority is exercised in 
order to avoid costs associated with unwanted externalities that may arise from employee discretion, 
such as moral hazard or coordination failures (e.g., scheduling problems, duplicative efforts, 
cannibalization of product markets, etc.). It is this kind of authority that a MNC HQ usually seeks to 
exercise relative to subsidiaries.  
Delegation of Decision Rights 
Network forms of the MNC are ostensibly oriented towards “innovation, renewal, and 
change” (Hedlund & Ridderstråle, 1996: 329), and are adopted in environments calling for such a 
dynamic stance. The reason that the MNC network form arguably fits dynamic and diverse 
environments is mainly that it goes much further than traditional hierarchical MNC forms with 
respect to delegating decision rights, that is, the right to make decisions over MNC resources. 
MNCs delegate decision rights for many reasons.  
A subsidiary may be better informed than the HQ with respect to, for example, the design and 
execution of competitive strategies in local markets, dealing with authorities, etc. Often such 
superior knowledge is costly to communicate to the HQ (Casson, 1994), and delegation reduces the 
costs of processing and transmitting information from MNC units to the HQ (Egelhoff, 1991; Nobel 
& Birkinshaw, 1998; Wolf & Egelhoff, 2002). Early work on the network MNC argues that higher 
complexity in the subsidiary environment makes it impossible for the HQ to keep decision-making 
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rights as the HQ lacks the knowledge required for the decision at hand (e.g., Nohria & Ghoshal, 
1994). Learning or entrepreneurship may also be a reason of delegation, because delegation may 
lead to the discovery of new knowledge that would not be discovered in the absence of delegation 
(cf. Foss, Foss & Klein, 2007). For example, a subsidiary might find new ways of approaching and 
mastering market challenges, such as overcoming competitors’ moves (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1997b, 
2001). Motivational reasons have also been highlighted (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Thus, delegation of 
discretion to subsidiary managers may raise perceived self-determination and thus strengthen 
autonomous motivation, including intrinsic motivation (Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Gagnè & Deci, 
2005). An increase in creativity in the pursuit of goals may follow; expert knowledge is better 
utilized, and learning is fostered. In contrast, decreasing the level of delegated discretion reduces 




Even in a network MNC, the HQ is still needed to define the decision rights of subsidiaries 
(i.e., give them “mandates”), to build an information infrastructure, set up reward systems, 
coordinate subsidiary actions (if  lateral consultation cannot take care of this), and engage in overall 
strategy making (e.g., Egelhoff, 2010). Therefore, there are limits to decentralization and the 
organizational design issue is deciding on the optimal choice between centralization and 
decentralization (e.g., Wolf, 1997).  
An important HQ function is to reduce costs from delegation. These are the well known 
agency costs (O’Donnell, 2000), but also coordination failures that may arise because of the 
decentralization that delegations implies (Egelhoff, 2010). Given that there are costs as well as 
benefits for MNCs of delegating discretion to subsidiaries, HQ confront a trade-off with respect to 
                                                          
6
 Such reasoning is the basis in some MNC literature for measuring subsidiary motivation with the proxy of subsidiary 




the choice of delegation (Jensen & Meckling, 1992). Under norms of rationality, MNCs seek to 
implement the optimal trade-off. This is manifest in the specific organizational form adopted by the 
MNC, as well as the instruments of organizational control that are deployed to support the optimal 
trade-off. Thus, defining the organizational structure of the MNC implies defining the decision 
rights of subsidiaries. To control the information and incentive issues that delegation gives rise to, 
MNCs implement management information and reward systems (Jensen & Meckling, 1992; 
Egelhoff, 2010).  
Once implemented, an optimal trade-off can persist as long as contingencies (technology, 
tastes, competitive conditions, etc.) remain stable. When they change, the optimum trade-off also 
changes. Changes in contingencies are likely to change the optimum degree of delegation. For 
example, research has demonstrated that the discretion levels of foreign R&D units change when 
the local environment changes (e.g., Asakawa 2001). Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) propose that 
local environmental dynamism increases the likelihood of parent- or subsidiary-driven charter 
change for the subsidiary, that is, the scope of activities for which the subsidiary has responsibility 
and discretion. Arguably, such phenomena are driven by perceived benefits of changing discretion 
being larger than the perceived costs. However, in order to fully understand the benefits and costs of 
changing the decision rights that are granted to subsidiaries, we submit that it is necessary to 
consider motivational and incentive considerations more fully. Specifically, we need to consider 
intervention hazards. 
Motivation and Incentive Problems 
Motivation and incentive problems have often been discussed in the MNC literature. Most 
contributions investigate the type of incentives used by HQs and their antecedents and 
consequences. For example, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) discuss the motivational dispositions 
of knowledge receivers and transmitters within MNCs. They find that incentives based on MNC 
11 
 
network gains do not influence knowledge outflows but only inflows from the HQ.
7
 They also 
regard subsidiary autonomy as one element of the subsidiary’s motivational disposition and they 
find that such autonomy has a negative effect on inflows from the MNC corporate HQ. Minbaeva et 
al. (2003) find support for the idea that certain incentive types drive subsidiary employee 
motivation which in turn positively moderates the relationship between employee ability and 
knowledge transfer. Mudambi and Navarra (2004) report that subsidiaries with high bargaining 
power tend to appropriate high levels of rents. They conclude that while subsidiary autonomy might 
be formally conferred by the HQ, it is also (informally) driven by the subsidiary’s internal 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the HQ. They suggest that strong organizational culture and mechanisms 
that may foster intrinsic motivation at the level of subsidiary employees may serve to constrain such 
rent-seeking. 
Overall, these papers have in common that they equate decentralized decision-making with 
subsidiary motivation, and that they address problems of moral hazard, with the HQ in the position 
of the principal and subsidiaries in the positions of agents. There is, however, no mention of the 
possibility that the HQ may act opportunistically relative to subsidiaries (or, at least, be perceived of 
acting opportunistically). 
The possibility of management opportunism has been discussed by Williamson (1985, 1996) 
under the heading of “selective intervention.”  As Williamson clarifies, selective intervention by a 
firm’s top-management may break commitments, and be harmful for this reason.  The problem is 
that the option to intervene ”… can be exercised both for good cause (to support expected net gains) 
and for bad (to support the subgoals of the intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151), and it may be 
difficult to verify the nature of the cause. Williamson casts this in terms of a credible commitment 
when he notes that there may be problems of “… credibly [promising] to respect autonomy save for 
                                                          
7
 The scope of incentives is defined as a continuum between incentives based on subsidiary-specific performance vs. 
incentives based on firm-level performance. 
12 
 
those cases where expected net gains to intervention can be projected” (Williamson, 1993: 104). A 
further problem is that even if intervention is “exercised for good cause,” levels lower in the 
organization may still believe that the intervention is undertaken to “support the subgoals of the 
intervenor.” Thus, cross-level dynamics of intentions and beliefs seem essential to understanding 
the motivational impact of HQ intervention.  
A Taxonomy of Headquarters Intervention 
These cross-level dynamics can be mapped with a 2x2 matrix that juxtaposes the HQ’s 
intentions (intervention for good and bad cause) and the subsidiaries’ perceptions (correct 
perception of HQ intentions and incorrect perceptions); see Figure 2.  
─────────────────── 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
─────────────────── 
 Cell I represents the extant MNC literature in which it is assumed that the HQ is benevolent 
and succeeds in making it credible that its actions are undertaken for good cause. Cell IV represents 
a situation in which the HQ acts opportunistically, and is perceived as such. In Cell III the HQ 
intervenes because of real net gains to be achieved by the intervention, but the subsidiary does not 
perceive it as such.
8
 In Cell II the HQ intervenes for bad cause, but this is not perceived by 
subsidiary managers. Cell II and III may represent unstable situations, because the subsidiaries may 
eventually find out that the HQs were intervening for bad (good) causes. Note, that of all cells, only 
Cell I creates unambiguously positive effects on MNC performance. Hence, Cells II, III, and IV 
represent situations of what we call “intervention hazards”.  
Why Harmful Intervention?  
                                                          
8 This suggests that there may be instances where, although the HQ is “in the know,” they should not intervene because 
this is harmful to subsidiary motivation.  
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 These situations represent hazards because they have the potential of harming subsidiary 
motivation, with harmful repercussions for subsidiary and eventually MNC level value creation. It may 
be asked why HQ would intervene such that motivation is harmed in subsidiaries and/or value is 
destroyed (Cells II-IV).  The following reasons may be offered.  First, HQ may derive a private benefit 
(in whatever form) from managerial intervention that destroys value. For example, to the extent that 
subsidiary autonomy is associated with slack, HQ may reduce autonomy and the associated slack 
because this makes them look good in the eyes of owners of the MNC.  This may work when the 
negative consequences for value creation only arrive after a significant delay, or if it is very difficult to 
trace these consequences to the managers’ behavior. A second reason relates to the time inconsistency 
problem (Kydland & Prescott, 1977).  In the context of delegation, such behavior may consist in, first, 
delegating substantial autonomy to subsidiaries.  When subsidiaries, enthused about their new 
extended discretion, come up with value-increasing ideas, HQ may harvest these, decide that the MNC 
already has its hands full with implementing the ideas, and that the level of delegated discretion may be 
usefully reduced in order to save costs. Third, HQ may wish to teach what they think are recalcitrant 
subsidiaries an example. Fourth, HQ may act on (actual or perceived) superior information. This 
situation might also include that the HQ acts with good intentions but that the assumptions on which 
the intervention effects are calculated do not hold, for example, because of wrong perceptions or 
bounded rationality. This is commonly described in the literature on parenting in which it is 
documented that HQ managers frequently overestimate, for example, synergy potential between 
subunits which is why they intervene (Goold, & Campbell, 1998). It also includes situations of Cell III, 
that is, “objectively” it is entirely warranted that HQ intervenes, and it does so with the best possible 
intentions. Nevertheless, these intentions are misread and interpreted as demotivating meddling.  
14 
 
Perceived and Actual HQ Opportunism and Motivation at Subsidiary Level 
 Research on organizational behavior suggests that employee motivation can be badly harmed 
by managerial intervention. Heath, Camerer and Knez (1993) argue that in an employment 
relationship, employees develop implicit and explicit expectations to the contract governing the 
relationship, and particularly to the benefits that they believe they deserve under the implicit 
contract, that is, their “entitlements”. Such expectations may be represented by “status quo” points, 
that is, what employees believe are their entitlements. The discretion that is delegated to employees 
may become part of their perceived entitlements, and negative motivational consequences follow 
from managerial intervention that interferes with these entitlements. Other parts of psychological 
research points to the related phenomenon of loss aversion, that is, a loss relative to a status quo is 
seen as more undesirable than a gain relative to the same point is seen as desirable (Kahneman, 
Knetsch & Thaler, 1991). This means that subsidiaries will develop a bias against reducing their 
autonomy, and that they can be expected to resist such changes, as well as suffer a loss of 
motivation if the change is, in fact, forced upon them (Foss, Foss & Vazquez, 2006).   
 A substantial body of work in organizational behavior on psychological contracts relates 
directly to these issues. In the present context, this work suggests that HQ intervention that is 
perceived of by subsidiaries as being unfair, arbitrary, and in other ways break with what is 
perceived of as established psychological or implicit contracts (i.e., it is opportunistic) is likely to 
harm motivation (Rousseau, 1989; Rosseau & Parks, 1992).
10
 Rousseau and Parks (1992: 36) state 
that “… contract violation erodes trust [and] undermines the employment relationship yielding 
lower employee contributions (e.g. performance and attendance) and lower employer investments 
(e.g., retention, promotion).” In particular, organizational citizenship behaviorthat is, employee 
behavior (“extra-role behavior”) that promotes organizational efficiency but is not explicitly 
recognized by an organization’s reward systemmay suffer from managerial intervention 
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(Robinson & Morrison, 1995). Empirical work has reached similar conclusions (Robinson, 1996; 
Foss, 2003; Foss, Foss & Vazquez, 2006). Finally, research in motivational psychology (i.e., “self-
determination theory”) suggests that individuals have fundamental needs for autonomy, 
competence, and relations (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & Deci, 2005). Work settings that allow 
these needs to be fulfilled typically also tap into the autonomous motivation of individuals. 
Handling certain tasks, notably those related to the exercise of creativity and problem-solving, 
require this kind of motivation (Amabile, 1996, 1998; Oldham & Cummings, 1996). External 
motivators, like the blatant exercise of authority (i.e., intervention), risk harming autonomous 
motivation because they reduce autonomy and competence.  
Consequences of Motivation Losses 
For the MNC, intervention that harms motivation at lower levels in the MNCs is a problem to 
the extent that loss of motivation leads to managers and employees cutting back on effort (both in 
their job roles and in their extra-role behaviors), and on firm-specific investments in human and 
social capital. In particular, extra-role behaviors are likely to suffer. Such behaviors are difficult to 
measure and directly reward. However, they may be essential to activities such as discovering, 
creating, sharing and integrating new knowledge within and between MNC units; investing in 
building and maintaining relations and information channels to other employees or units in the 
MNC; and supplying the extra intelligent effort that may be required to efficiently cope with 
changing external contingencies. Notice that these activities are all at the core of the network MNC. 
Thus, the network MNC may be particularly vulnerable to the kind of HQ intervention that is 
perceived of as demotivating. We examine this in the following section. 
THE NETWORK MNC AND SELECTIVE INTERVENTION HAZARDS 
For the following discussion of HQ intervention we make use of the research model that is depicted 
in Figure 3. Our key point is that implementing a network MNC has an influence on both 
16 
 
dimensions of Figure 2: the extent to which HQs intervene, as well as how subsidiaries perceive 
interventions. 
─────────────────── 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
─────────────────── 
Intervention in the Network MNC  
Network MNCs are chosen over more hierarchical forms in highly dynamic environments and 
involve delegating substantial decision autonomy to subsidiaries. Such environments may cause 
misfit between the organization of the firm and its environment, as new and different contingencies 
arise. For example, Hedlund (1986) suggests that the hierarchical relationships within network 
organizations are of a temporary nature, and that they can frequently change direction, that is, 
decision rights can de facto be transferred to the subsidiary to such an extent that the HQ has very 
limited influence over the subsidiary. However, this might also go the other way round and HQs 
might feel the need to intervene. As a consequence, the structuring of the coordination and control 
system, including the delegation of decision-rights, is at any point in time likely to be imperfect 
(e.g., Hedlund, 1986; Nickerson & Zenger, 2005; Piekkari et al., 2010).  
The impact of environmental changes in driving HQ intervention is reinforced by the fact that 
the network MNC is characterized by an often substantial dispersion of knowledge and the HQ 
decision problems are shrouded in uncertainty (Forsgren & Holm, 2010).  The HQ may suffer from 
a lack of information about the subsidiary context and the knowledge controlled by the subsidiary. 
Complemented with bounded rationality and radical uncertainty, such lack of information suggests 
that the HQ in actuality is unable to perfectly design the organization of the MNC, and especially 
the delegation of decision-rights, and will have to approximate it through a process of groping. Such 
groping may be manifest in frequent redesigns of the structure. In sum, the likelihood is high that 
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HQs need to or feel the need to intervene on a frequent basis in the network MNC, and more so than 
in more traditional hierarchical modes of the MNC.  
This would be less of a problem if that additional intervention was firmly placed in Cell I 
(Figure 2), because, although errors would still be made, at least subsidiary motivation would not be 
harmed. However, much of the additional intervention will take place in Cells II, III and IV. For 
example, a member of the top-management team may decide to act tough and slash costs in a 
subsidiary, because this benefits her own career. Because a MNC is in general characterized by 
strong spatial dispersion and uncertain environments, a manager may get away with this kind of 
behavior, as tracing costs and managers’ behaviors might be a big challenge. For example, the 
behavior of a regional manager who behaves opportunistically against regional subsidiaries in Asia 
might be unnoticed by the HQ in Europe, and the costs of this intervention might be misunderstood 
because of cultural and communication issues. Hence, it may well be that such an opportunistic 
manager is not punished for his interventions. 
 Relatedly, HQ managers can be inclined to intervene in subsidiaries because they think that 
exemplary intervention may show to very powerful subsidiaries “who the boss is”. Goold and 
Campbell (1998) argue that senior managers attribute the right to make decisions and to overrule to 
their status within the firm, that is, managers might feel redundant in a system which allocates 
substantial decision rights to lower levels of the firm. Recent literature has shown that subsidiaries 
can sometimes be very powerful in the sense that they are able to reject HQ orders, influence 
corporate decisions, and appropriate rents on the subsidiary level which would have created more 
benefits if the sources of these rents could have been exploited within the whole MNC (Andersson 
et al. 2007; Mudambi & Navarra 2004). In such a situation, HQ managers might more likely feel the 
need to overrule decisions and to intervene in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the 
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subsidiaries even if this is not to the benefit of the whole corporation. The above reasoning gives 
rise to the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: The more the MNC has implemented a network organization, the higher the 
frequency of HQ intervention (for good cause and for bad cause). 
While MNC network organizations are more prone to intervention overall, intervention that is 
understood and/or accepted to be for good cause does not lead to motivation problems per se. Yet, 
chances are that such intervention is perceived as an undue breaking of commitment by the HQ. 
The reason is that it is difficult to verify the nature of the cause of intervention or that the 
communication that comes along with the intervention is imperfect. The network MNC has barriers 
to successful vertical communication (e.g. O’Donnell 2000), for example, because of a lower 
degree of formalization than in more hierarchical forms. The uncertain and fast-changing 
environments that the network MNC is typically located in increase the likelihood that 
communication of intervention is not synchronized with actual events that lead the intervention in 
the first place. Finally, powerful subsidiaries might request a lot of very detailed explanations 
regarding the background of interventions while the complex lateral interdependencies between the 
units means that no single unit probably has a good overview and understanding of the issues at 
hand. In sum, this results in misperceptions and, in the worst case, a general bias at the subsidiary 
level of assuming that any intervention is for a bad cause. In other words: 
Proposition 2: The more the MNC has implemented a modern network organization, 
the more likely the subsidiary perceives HQ intervention as being for bad cause. 
By definition, intervention for good cause is intended to lead to higher MNC performance 
because it is undertaken only when the HQ manager identifies real net gains from intervening. For 
example, the HQ might intervene and standardize a product offering across countries because 
standardization gains across all countries are higher than adaptation gains. Yet, the motivation of 
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subsidiaries might still be harmed when intervention for good cause is misperceived by the 
subsidiary managers. For example, Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilenius, and Arvidsson(2000) have shown 
that when HQ perceptions and subsidiary perceptions differ, it will eventually have a negative effect 
on cooperation. We argue that communicating effectively the reasons and needs for good cause 
intervention is very difficult within the modern network MNC. Hence, we expect that frequent 
miscommunication and misperceptions influence the relationship between good cause intervention 
and MNC performance in a negative way.  
By contrast, HQ interventions for bad cause do not produce negative motivational effects in 
case the subsidiaries do not recognize the true cause of the intervention (Cell II), at least not 
immediately. This might be the situation when the HQ is able to create a false picture of the 
intervention and since the MNC context makes it very difficult to verify the nature of the 
intervention, subsidiaries might believe the HQ managers. However, even if effects on subsidiary 
motivation is absent, bad cause intervention is negatively related to MNC performance since it is, 
by definition, an intervention which is not made to realize net gains for the whole MNC. This 
negative effect is likely to be even stronger when the subsidiaries correctly identify the intervention 
as being for bad cause. Hence, we formulate the following two propositions: 
P3a: The extent to which subsidiaries perceive good cause intervention as for bad cause 
negatively moderates the positive relationship between good cause intervention and 
MNC performance. 
P3b: The extent to which subsidiaries perceive bad cause intervention as for bad cause 




MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES 
 TO SELECTIVE INTERVENTION HAZARDS 
All firms, MNCs included, face intervention hazards, but we argue that the modern network MNC 
is particularly prone to such hazards. Hence, the motivation and incentive problems of the modern 
MNC organization go beyond managing subsidiary moral hazard and opportunism. This is a serious 
problem given that subsidiary motivation is supposed to be a key driver of network MNCs’ 
performance in the first place (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991). An important organizational design and 
management problem therefore concerns keeping intervention hazards at bay. In the following, we 
discuss three distinct yet interrelated ways to manage these hazards. We link the established issues 
of “normative integration” and “procedural justice” to the issue of intervention hazards, and we 
discuss structural remedies.   
Normative Integration 
Normative integration has received much emphasis in research on MNC organization (Nohria 
& Goshal, 1994). It is argued that common values and beliefs provide harmony of interests and 
diminish the danger of opportunistic behavior inside the firm, particularly from employees (Ouchi, 
1980). Thus, normative integration acts as an implicit contract that instructs organizational members 
about appropriate behavior and in particular about how to react to new contingencies (cf. Kreps, 
1990). In the MNC literature it is featured as an alternative way of how the HQ can “control” the 
behavior of the subsidiaries. Under normative integration, subsidiary managers are imbued with the 
values and goals of the MNC and thus act in accordance with them (Ouchi & Maguire 1975; 
Edström & Galbraith 1977). This effectively reduces the need for control by the HQ (Hedlund, 
1986).  
However, normative integration has to our knowledge exclusively been characterized as a tool 
available to the HQ to manage its subsidiary network. We argue that normative integration is also 
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one way of how intervention hazards can be managed. First, the implementation of a strong 
organizational culture based on a shared understanding of goals, norms, and beliefs, requires efforts 
over a relatively long period of time. The success of these efforts is based largely on how consistent 
and credible the key issues of the culture are communicated as this facilitates their adoption at lower 
levels. This has the effect that HQ managers themselves identify more with this culture over time; 
they get socialized as well. Since it is very unlikely that the corporate culture openly features HQ 
intervention for bad cause, it is very likely that HQ managers investing strongly in corporate culture 
also refrain from bad cause intervention. In other words, a shared normative context has the effect 
of enhancing the sense of mutual interdependence between HQ and subsidiary level (Nohria & 
Ghoshal, 1994) with HQ opportunism being restrained very much in the same way that subsidiary 
opportunism is restrained. 
P4: MNCs that are high in normative integration will have fewer incidences of 
intervention for bad cause.  
While HQ managers might refrain from opportunistic intervention under conditions of high 
normative integration and shared values, it might not be eradicated completely. However, we argue 
that even if HQ managers sometimes act opportunistically, the effect on subsidiary motivation and 
consequently on MNC performance might be less severe under conditions of high normative 
integration than under conditions of a lack of strong organizational culture. This is due to the fact 
that subsidiary managers simply do not expect the HQ to act opportunistically which in turn 
influences their perceptions of the interventions positively. Since the verification of the true causes 
of the intervention is difficult, as are the costs, this might have a strong impact. As long as such 
interventions occur seldom, subsidiary motivation might not be harmed. Similarly, a strong 
organizational culture is likely to be based on the promotion of good cause intervention only. This 
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improves subsidiary perceptions in general and hence moderates the effect that true good cause 
intervention has on MNC performance.
9
 
P5a: The extent to which the MNC is high in normative integration positively moderates 
the negative relationship between intervention for bad cause and MNC performance. 
P5b: The extent to which the MNC is high in normative integration positively moderates 
the positive relationship between intervention for good cause and MNC performance. 
Procedural Justice 
Similarly to the normative integration concept, the concept of procedural justice has been 
discussed as a tool to control and influence the behavior of subsidiaries as opposed to managing 
potential opportunism at the HQ-level. It was introduced to the MNC literature mainly by Kim and 
Mauborgne (1991; 1993; 1995). Procedural justice can be defined as the perceived fairness of 
formal procedures governing decisions involving the treatment and benefits of participating partners 
(Luo 2009). In the context of the MNC, this perceived justice is based on a consistent set of 
procedures for decision making in which HQ decisions are accompanied with extensive bilateral 
communication between the HQ and the subsidiaries, and the opportunity for subsidiaries to 
challenge HQ views (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991). They argue that the increasingly network-like 
organization of MNCs decreases the opportunities for HQs to use “hierarchy”, that is, fiat, 
monitoring, and appraisal capability, to make subsidiary managers implement global strategies. This 
is based on the idea that subsidiary managers in network organizations are the most important 
“implementers,” but that they are likely to have a stronger sense of their own goals and they are 
often resource-rich and powerful. Hence, in order to be able to successfully implement global 
strategies, the motivation of the subsidiary managers are required. They conclude that one key 
element in maintaining such motivation is procedural justice in decision-making processes which 
                                                          
9
 We acknowledge that in rare cases the detection of intended bad-cause intervention can have very severe 
consequences for motivation. This might be because subsidiary managers see the stark contrast between the 
organizational culture and the bad-cause intervention.  
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they, in principle, interpret as a driver or a complement of normative integration. Under conditions 
of high procedural justice, subsidiary managers are motivated to comply with top management 
decisions even if they are unfavorable for the specific subsidiary, that is, when MNC-wide gains 
prevailed over subunit optimization.  
We argue that procedural justice has two important effects. First, similarly to the effect of 
normative integration, the extent to which the modern network MNC has implemented a system of 
procedural justice reduces the likelihood that HQ managers act opportunistically, that is, intervene 
for bad cause. A system of procedural justice is based on the fact that the HQ is supplying a 
justification for their behavior and potential interventions as well as accepting challenging and 
refuting from the subsidiary managers (Kim & Mauborgne 1991). Hence, it is more likely that 
opportunistic behavior is detected and finally sanctioned in one way or another. The opportunity to 




P6: The higher the MNC is in procedural justice, the less frequent is HQ intervention 
for bad cause.  
Second, a system of procedural justice is the basis for high quality communication in which 
HQ managers acknowledge the information requirements by subsidiaries, provide the necessary 
details and reasons, and specifically take into account the potential negative effect on subsidiary 
motivation in case the HQ decision is perceived as being unfavorable for the subsidiary. Hence, we 
suggest that a formalized decision system decreases the likelihood that intervention for good cause 
is misperceived by subsidiary managers.  
P7: The higher the MNC is in procedural justice, the less likely that the subsidiary 
perceives HQ intervention as being for bad cause.  
                                                          
10
 Kim and Mauborgne (1995) provide some support for the idea that a procedural justice system improves also the 
content of strategies. This is aligned with our reasoning that bad cause intervention (intended or due to bounded 
rationality) is less likely to occur. 
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Structural Mechanisms  
 For both normative integration as well as for procedural justice systems we have argued that they 
constrain primarily HQ intervention for bad cause. Research in political economy suggests that it is 
often in an organization’s long-term interest to avoid later period actions that break promises (with 
respect to delegation), and that avoiding such behavior may be accomplished by credibly constraining 
the flexibility of managers in such a manner that the initial promise becomes credible (Kydland & 
Prescott, 1977).  Normative integration and procedural justice may serve these functions because they 
commit HQ to certain lines of action and rule others out.  
 However, in principle, constraining the flexibility of the HQ to selectively intervene in general 
can also help to reduce harmful selective intervention (not only those that are for bad cause). Since we 
have argued that especially network-like MNCs are prone to selective intervention (cf. Proposition 1) 
different organizational forms might remedy the issue of intervention hazards. MNCs struggling with 
intervention hazards in the network organization could be tempted to alter their organizational form 
altogether. To this end, Milgrom (1988) argues that employee rent-seeking that aims at influencing 
hierarchical superiors to selectively intervene to the benefit of the rent-seeking employees will be 
constrained by rigid, hierarchical structures which makes such rent-seeking more costly. Furthermore, 
a strong increase in formalized procedures and the implementation of strict rules and policies by 
definition limits the scope for selective intervention. “(manuals), standing orders, standard operating 
procedures, etc.” (Ghoshal & Nohria 1998, p. 335) reduce variance in how decisions are taken, i.e. 
these mechanisms formally fasten decision rights as well as inputs to decision making on both the HQ 
as well as the subsidiary level. Hence, this adds to the arguments in favor of more hierarchical 
structures in MNCs listed by Egelhoff (2010). 
 Another reason why hierarchical structure may constrain managerial intervention is that the 
hierarchy is not just a structure of authority, but also one of information (Galbraith, 1973; Egelhoff 
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1991). The informational distance between HQ and subsidiaries influences the basis for exercising 
judgment with respect to decisions whether to overrule lower levels in the MNC or not. All else being 
equal, the more hierarchical layers that information has to pass through before reaching the exercising 
authority, the less adequate is this basis likely to be. If the HQ realizes that because of information loss, 
bounded rationality, and ignorance about subsidiary conditions, it is not in a position to rationally 
decide whether to selectively intervene or not, it should not intervene (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). Thus, 
somewhat paradoxically, the HQ may decide to commit itself by delegating even more decision 
autonomy to the subsidiaries and by deliberately refraining from gaining certain kind of information 
(i.e, making itself ignorant).  
 In sum, firms could be tempted to constrain HQ intervention in general by modifying the 
organizational form altogether. 
P8: The more the network MNCs struggle with keeping intervention hazards at bay the 
higher the likelihood of a change of organizational form towards either more 
hierarchical, formalized structures or towards even more strongly decentralized, 
multidomestic structures.  
  
The Inherent Trade-offs of the Network Model  
Obviously, the structural remedies discussed in Proposition 8 come at high costs. First, there 
are limits to how far HQ can constrain itself, because a complete hands off strategy may also mean 
sacrificing the benefits of integrating subsidiaries under the MNC umbrella, i.e. of achieving 
integration benefits. This could have severe consequences in transnational environments. Second, 
more hierarchical approaches forego benefits due to flexibility and adaptation.  
What emerges is a picture of the network MNC with a number of deep trade-offs that includes 
also the previously discussed remedies of normative integration and procedural justice. First, 
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establishing procedural justice and normative integration may be quite costly in terms of defining 
basic normative rules, disseminating them, exercising the symbolic management that can maintain 
and enforce them, etc. This is particularly likely to be the case in MNCs that are very large and 
dispersed in many different contexts (Egelhoff 1999; Kim & Mauborgne 1993).  The costs of these 
mechanisms should be balanced against the benefits from reducing motivational loss by 
constraining selective intervention. This may tilt the trade-off in favor of more traditional structures: 
A traditional hierarchical structure likely entails lower costs in terms of setting up and running 
systems for conflict resolution and socializing instruments (Williamson, 1985). 
Second, and relatedly, the MNC literature forwards that in a turbulent environment network 
structures are required to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. An internal justice system might 
delay decision-making because subsidiary and HQ input has to be heard and evaluated. Such delays 
could be very costly. Somewhat paradoxically, the need for procedural justice is greater in network 
organizations, but at the same time, it makes the implementation of procedural justice more difficult 
(Kim & Mauborgne 1993).  
These trade-offs seem inherent to the network model. Identifying them and the costs and the 
benefits that give rise to trade-offs, help MNC managers in selecting organizational forms and 
mechanisms that are least second-best, that is, the best that can be done given the circumstances.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The strong emphasis of recent MNC literature on the subsidiary-level has implied a certain neglect 
of HQ activities and rationales (Egelhoff, 2010). What is particularly missing in the current body of 
literature is a theoretically grounded understanding of how the HQ can manage acts of intervention 
that it—qua its HQ status—must perform smoothly, efficiently, and in such a way that little or no 
harm to subsidiary motivation is caused (unless such harm is overwhelmed by beneficial 
consequences of the intervention). For example, Hedlund’s (1986) notion of multiple, frequently 
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changing hierarchies bypasses this question. He does not raise issues related to whether the HQ has 
the required knowledge and understanding to engage in organization changes, or how such changes 
might be initiated, motivated, explained, sanctioned, and perceived by lower levels in the MNC 
network.  These issues remain under-researched, in spite of recent attention to HQ ignorance 
(Forsgren et al., 2005), uncertainty of decision-making (Forsgren & Holm, 2010), and the political 
dimensions of MNC network organization (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Andersson et al., 2007). 
However, even such work still emphasize the power and interests of subsidiaries and does not focus 
explicitly on the HQ and its role in initiating and managing differentiated and flexible discretion 
arrangements across the MNC.  
We contribute to this gap in a number of ways. By merging relevant work in the fields of 
international management, economics of the firm, and organizational behavior, we have developed 
a theoretical framework that links MNC network characteristics to selective intervention hazards 
(and ultimately MNC performance). Hence, we have suggested a new set of items for research in 
the function and consequences of the HQ in MNCs. The starting point for our argument is that the 
HQ is not always benevolent as is routinely assumed in the MNC literature. We argue that the 
network MNC is subject to more frequent selective HQ intervention, is more prone to suffer from 
HQ opportunism, and that it is more likely that subsidiaries misperceive even intervention for good 
cause. In other words, intervention hazards are more rampant in the network MNC. Thus, we argue 
that the dominant assumption of the MNC literature that corporate HQs are benevolent is a strong 
assumption, as selective intervention hazard may be substantial.  
However, managerial and organizational means exist that can handle intervention hazards. 
First, we argue that HQ activity can be influenced by normative integration and procedural justice. 
These mechanisms can help reducing the incidence of bad cause HQ behavior and the risk that 
lower levels in the MNC mistake good cause intervention for bad cause intervention. This is an 
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important contribution to the literature as both mechanisms have exclusively been discussed as a 
means to manage subsidiaries. We show that these mechanisms might also work “upwards” to 
manage reverse incentive issues. Hence, both mechanisms might be even more important for 
network MNCs than usually conceived in large parts of the literature.  
Second, both mechanisms suggest important conclusions for the tasks of the HQ and the 
concept of the differentiated network MNC (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989). Normative integration and 
procedural justice are both mechanisms that require MNC wide standardization and to some extent 
also formalization. Yet, the differentiated network MNC is defined as an organization which 
requires different ways of coordination and control for every single subsidiary (Nohria & Ghoshal 
1997). If normative integration and procedural justice are of such high importance then the HQ’s 
key task is much more about standardizing across the whole MNC than about differentiating its 
activities according to the subsidiary context. Of course, the outcome of individual decisions can 
still be adapted to a local subsidiary’s context, yet, the HQ’s role lies in creating a robust and 
efficient procedural justice system so that perceptions and intentions of interventions are such that 
hazards are reduced. Furthermore, we have highlighted a number of crucial trade-offs. By and large, 
the literature seems to argue that the specific context of network MNCs requires both mechanisms 
while it creates simultaneously huge constraints on its effective implementation. Thus, it seems to 
be a particular ability of the MNC to resolve this trade-off—an ability which is arguably located at 
the HQ-level.  
Third, we discuss structural mechanisms to manage intervention hazards. We argue that, 
paradoxically, one way of keeping intervention hazards under control is either the strong increase of 
hierarchy in the sense of additional hierarchical layers—or, the near complete abolishment of 
hierarchy by granting even more discretion to the subsidiaries. This is an important implication, 
since both mechanisms move, in effect, the MNC structure away from the network MNC. A 
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strengthening of the hierarchical structure turns the network MNC more into a formal “global” 
organization. Rendering even more discretion into the hands of the subsidiaries turns the MNC into 
a multi-domestic MNC in which benefits from integrating the subsidiaries within the MNC are 
more strongly neglected. Hence, given the tremendous difficulties firms face when they try to build 
systems of normative integration and procedural justice, as well as the structural tendencies to 
remedy network-related intervention hazards with non-network structures, it is not surprising that 
some researchers suggest that MNC networks are inherently unstable organizations, that they are 
rarely observed empirically (e.g. Wolf 1997), and that firms might often modulate between 
organizational structures (Nickerson & Zenger 2005).  
Future Research  
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to be concerned with intervention hazards in MNCs. 
While we think that this soil is potentially very fertile research-wise, it has basically not been 
ploughed so far.  More research is therefore needed in a number of areas. 
First, more conceptual work could be done by adding complexity to our matrix of intervention 
situations, e.g. by varying the level of knowledge and understanding of HQ (cf. Forsgren & Holm 
2010) that allows them to identify true intervention opportunities. Furthermore, future work could 
link intervention hazards to the scope of the MNC based on our reasoning that complete hands-off 
strategies for certain subsidiaries might be effective remedies to intervention hazards while they 
make it more likely that such a subsidiary does not remain long within the MNC portfolio. Finally, 
it might be valuable to complement our analysis and to engage into differentiating further the 
effects of HQ interventions especially in terms of net value creation.  
Second, empirical work could validate our key constructs in this paper, notably those of 
selective intervention for good and bad causes. It could also further propositions that may be 
distilled from our reasoning. For example, the harmful effects of selective intervention for bad 
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cause could be further elaborated. For instance, it may be an empirically open question whether 
powerful subsidiaries stimulate more or less HQ intervention. One argument (that we have 
developed here) is that it is more likely that HQ intervene to teach a subsidiary “a lesson” when the 
subsidiary is strong than when it is less strong. A contrary argument is that HQ will refrain from 
intervening vis-à-vis powerful subsidiaries that can retaliate in various ways. Note also that our 
argument is essentially a multi-level one (the relevant variables in our argument are placed on HQ 
as well as subsidiary levels). Thus, empirical tests of our reasoning should in principle involve 
multi-level data sampling and the application of multi-level methods.   
Theoretically, more research is needed on the set of organizational mechanisms that influence 
the decision of MNC managers to selectively intervene or not. First, more precise arguments are 
needed, and perhaps even the kind of formal modeling exercise undertaken by Argyres and Mui 
(2007) who, like us, are taken up with issues of credible commitment in corporate hierarchies. 
Second, theorizing is needed to make us better understand what are the relations between different 
kinds of mechanisms inside hierarchies that handle intervention hazards. For example, are 
normative integration and procedural justice substitutes or complements for more hierarchical 
structures with respect to taming intervention hazards?  While much needs to be done empirically 
and theoretically, we are confident that intervention hazards in MNCs is a new exciting angle on 
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Figure 3: Key Constructs and Their Relationships
P6
P7
P8
